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Key Insights:
• The military invariably conducts conﬂict and post-conﬂict operations with other
agencies. These agencies must be prepared and resourced for their participation,
including transition from or to serving as lead-agency for the operation.
• The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to deﬁne war or conﬂict more broadly, and
incorporate other agencies, especially Department of State (DoS), into its planning and
execution phases much earlier and more completely than is now the practice.
• The military’s changing role requires it to better understand world cultures where it
operates and the organizational cultures of agencies with whom it works.
• The DoS has begun the organizational change necessary to become an equal operational
partner with the military, but remains inadequately funded.
• The United States clearly recognizes the need for international peacekeeping partners; its
difﬁculty is to determine the appropriate role for those collaborators, to determine needs
for assistance to become better partners, and to effectively manage that assistance.
The Women In International Security (WIIS) and Georgetown University, in cooperation with the Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, sponsored a conference, “Stabilization and Post-Conﬂict Operations:
The Role of the Military,” on November 17, 2004. Over 80 people participated in the conference conducted at
Georgetown University. For areas of geographical emphasis, the conference sponsors selected the Middle East
and Africa. The Middle East was an obvious choice, based on current interest in ongoing stability operations.
Africa is recognized widely as a location with potential for similar activity, and the United States and Europe
have invested effort in preparing African militaries to respond.
The conference program was designed to discuss stabilization and post-conﬂict operations in terms of: (1) the
deﬁnition and strategic nature of such operations, (2) the military’s doctrine and preparedness for conducting
operations of this type, (3) international cooperation and learning among militaries to prepare them for such
operations, and (4) the way ahead for the U.S. military and government to organize and prepare for stabilization
and post-conﬂict operations. A panel, with members drawn from diverse backgrounds, was dedicated to each
of these four topics.

designed to perform ﬁve functions: (1) identify needed
assets for an operation, (2) quickly and effectively
deploy DoS assets―with a permanent command
structure, (3) monitor and conduct contingency plans,
(4) exercise and employ with interagency partners,
and (5) coordinate collection of “lessons learned”
and incorporate them into operations. Its ambitious
goal is to address, together with all echelons of other
agencies, the doctrine, rules of engagement, and
strategic concepts for the full spectrum of conﬂict. A
major goal is to develop plans for better balancing
resources between military and civilian efforts.

Deﬁnition and Strategic Nature.
Three themes were provided for panel members
addressing the deﬁnition and strategic nature of
stability operations: (1) towards a framework for
examining stabilization and post-conﬂict operations;
(2) critical elements of stabilization in societies
emerging from conﬂict; and (3) comparative advantages between military and civilian actors in
post-conﬂict situations. Panel members brought
diverse backgrounds and perspectives to bear,
including those from the DoS, private national
security
research
institutes,
and
academic
institutions.
Though the United States periodically has been
involved in post-conﬂict “nation-building,” it has never
been enthusiastic about the task. The noted successes
have been more attributable to the combinations
of excellent commanders and area experts than to
well-developed frameworks and plans. The current
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has fostered concern
for the effectiveness of the U.S. interagency approach
to the task. Over the past 2 years, there has been no
shortage of frameworks and plans for post-conﬂict
operations. There has not been, however, an equivalent
amount of activity at the strategic level designed to
clarify when and to what degree nation-building is
appropriate, based on our Nation’s mid- and longterm strategic goals. Rather, in a short time we have
gone from denying the need for nation-building to an
assumption that it is necessary after any conﬂict. Like
any assumption, this one needs periodic evaluation to
determine its continued efﬁcacy.
One of the unquestionably positive outcomes from
recent events is the nearly universal recognition that
conﬂict and post-conﬂict operations are necessarily
interagency. It is equally accepted that interagency
cooperation and operational effectiveness have plenty
of room for improvement. DoD has conceded that war
is not just military business, with a clean hand-off to
DoS at the end of some mythical ﬁnal battle. And DoS
has realized that it needs to better prepare to be an
equal partner at an earlier stage in conﬂicts. The
two principal agencies, along with a host of other
governmental,
trans-governmental,
and
nongovernmental agencies, must ﬁnd ways to contribute
according to their core competencies from the earliest
phases of conﬂict, if the desired strategic outcome is
to be achieved.
In light of this new age of interagency cooperation,
DoS has formed the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization. This organization is

Military’s Doctrine and Preparedness.
The military doctrine and preparedness panel
addressed three stability and post-conﬂict operational
issues: (1) doctrinal issues and military institutional
culture, (2) defense transformation and military
effectiveness, and (3) resources, capabilities, and
training. The panel members were predominantly from
DoD, representing both joint and Army organizations;
they were uniformed, retired, and civilian, and
from both military staffs and military educational
institutions. One was from an independent civilian
think tank; she, too, had a long history of defense
work.
Panelists agreed that effective interagency
work is essential and needs improvement if the
military’s efforts are to be effective for achieving our
Nation’s political goals while removing the source
of conﬂict. Such agreement indicates the extent to
which organizational cultural change already has
occurred in the military. The services, Joint Staff and
commands, Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense, and
Congress are producing, at a frenzied pace, multiple
proposals and initiatives to produce more effective
joint, combined, and interagency operations. But these
efforts are not always coordinated and are sometimes
in disagreement.
The Joint Forces Command is tasked with the
responsibility for integrating DoD’s internal doctrinal
changes. Stability operations, as a complex subset
of post-conﬂict operations, is a special integration
challenge, requiring a long-term partnership with
DoS and other agencies while conducting a series of
operations that modulate in intensity. The command’s
intended product is a better set of joint concepts
of operation for the range of missions classiﬁed as
stability operations and a ﬂexible joint command and
control structure capable of better using any mix of
forces.
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In addition to developing joint concepts of operation
for a range of operations designed to create stability, a
number of decisions are needed to ensure effectiveness
in those operations. Those decisions include (1)
how many stability operations should the United
States be able to conduct simultaneously, (2) what
rebalancing of capabilities is necessary, (3) whether
to create specialized forces or use general-purpose
forces with focused training and organization, and
(4) what changes are needed in professional military
education. These decisions are particularly important
if we assume, as most security experts do, that the
demand for stability operations is likely to continue at
current rates or grow.
Of the decisions that must be made, the one about
specialized forces especially is contested. Generally,
the Army has resisted the call for large formations
specializing in, structured for, and trained exclusively
to conduct stability and reconstruction operations.
Rather, the Army is balancing its existing force
structure, both within and between the active and
reserve formations. It also is adjusting collective
training and some aspects of individual training and
education. Interagency education remains centered
at the senior service school level, but is gradually
being incorporated into mid- and even junior-level
professional military education.
Military initiatives undoubtedly are shifting
internal resources to enhance capabilities and training
for conducting stability operations. Successful stability
operations and reconstruction requires the military
to become an advocate for passing the operational
lead and supporting resources to other agencies,
particularly DoS. The other agencies need to be
ready to accept the burden of leadership, a difﬁcult
challenge for under-resourced agencies. The military
can help by supporting more effective interagency
training exercises, more organizational intercultural
education (at earlier career stages), and more support
for preventative diplomacy.

All panelists agreed that it is important for the
United States to have international support and
cooperation when conducting stability operations.
All agreed, as well, that the demand for peacekeeping
troops exceeds the availability of properly trained
and willing peacekeepers. The United States clearly
recognizes the need for international peacekeeping
partners; its difﬁculty is to determine the appropriate
role for those collaborators. U.S. assistance to potential
partners is regulated by security assistance laws and
programs administered by DoS. This arrangement is
often proper and makes perfect sense, but sometimes
not. The DoS is certainly underfunded for the task,
and DoD might be the appropriate lead in some
circumstances; additional legal ﬂexibility might
improve assistance.
Recognition of both the need for international
cooperation and the difﬁculty it involves is shared
by other major powers; countries such as the United
Kingdom and France also are seeking solutions through
internal organizational change, more comprehensive
planning, and cooperation with potential partners.
The United Kingdom has established an interagency
organization to address, from intervention to stabilization, its peacekeeping framework, operational
planning, and resource/deployment issues.
The French stress the importance of Africa to their
fellow western powers. They are convinced that
African militaries have the capacity for peacekeeping,
and France is teaming with the United States and
United Kingdom, with European Union cooperation,
to train African peacekeepers under the African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program. This program has trained over
18,000 peacekeeping troops from 10 countries.
Though these forces have been effective in several
operations, they have notable operational constraints.
Their capacity is restricted to regional and subregional
operations, and internal rivalries can further restrict
participation. But the issues faced by Africa are often
regional, crossing national boundaries, and especially
receptive to an African cooperative solution. ACOTA
is a step towards helping Africa to become capable of
taking responsibility for its own peacekeeping efforts,
though the program remains well short of meeting its
supporters’ ultimate goals.
Nigeria is an example of one African country’s
commitment to peacekeeping. Its troops have contributed between 30 and 50 percent of the forces to
several peacekeeping operations. Their cooperation,
along with other African countries, has made some
peacekeeping operations possible and certainly

International Cooperation and Learning
among Militaries.
The third panel addressed the international
issues of (1) strategic partnerships and institutional
collaborations, (2) opportunities and constraints of
operational cooperation, and (3) collaborative training
programs. Panelists consisted of members of European
and African militaries and civilian international
experts from DoS and the National War College.
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relieved U.S. and European militaries from some of the
responsibility. The United States and United Kingdom
recently have begun cooperating with Nigeria, and
hopes are high that this will lead to even more effective
peacekeeping.
One of the international contributions sought by the
United States is constabulary forces, those performing
a role between what normally is performed by
the military and that performed by the police. The
United States could develop its own force to serve in
this unfamiliar role, or it can rely on European and
South American forces that have a long constabulary
history.

1. Culture: Culture is important at two levels, internationally and organizationally. Awareness and
sensitivity are important when working with or
operating in another culture. The same qualities
are important when working with other agencies,
especially those with very different organizational
cultures than our own. It is unlikely that an “interagency culture” will be developed, but better
understanding and mutual appreciation can be
achieved.
2. Deﬁnition of War: Unless war, or at least conﬂict,
is deﬁned more broadly, we are unlikely to dedicate signiﬁcantly increased resources to the range
of activities that are outside our present deﬁnition
of war, but essential for us to achieve the goals of
war.

The Way Ahead for the U.S. Military
and Government.

3. Forces―specialized or general purpose: the dichotomy is false, but the need to accomplish what each
is designed to achieve is real. We have no forces
that are so specialized that they cannot do many
things well, nor do we have those that are so general that they cannot become focused and effective
when necessary. We simply must decide where in
that spectrum we want most of our forces to fall,
given our perception of what we think they will be
called upon to do.

The way ahead is probably more clear now than
it was a few years ago, but is still hindered by lack
of agreement about the desired goal of the journey.
Clearly there is more agreement that interagency and
combined operations are needed to take advantage
of interrelated skill-sets and to accumulate resources
needed for stability operations’ long duration.
Successful stability operations also require changing
organizational cultures, better relationships among
agencies and partners, and the right people in the right
jobs.
What is not clear is also important―such as what
we can hope to achieve; liberal democracy may be
too difﬁcult, and the collaborators must agree on
an acceptable alternative. Disagreements are likely
to continue about rules of engagement, operational
doctrine, and the proper sequencing of requirements.
And as much as we agree that DoD must work with
civilian agencies at all phases of war, there are inherent
dangers with embedding civilians into military
formations. As culturally different as DoD is from
DoS, there are even greater differences among some of
the civilian agencies.
With all the admonishments and subsequent
changes in interagency relations over the past few
years, hopes were high that operations in Iraq would
be more effectively coordinated. Though there may
have been improvements, one of the likely important
“lessons learned” from Iraq will be that agencies did
not operate together very effectively. The interagency
efforts could still be rightly called ad hoc operations.
With all these accomplishments and continuing
issues in mind, the way ahead must respond to ﬁve
themes:

4. Stabilization and Reconstruction: To view stabilization and reconstruction as post-conﬂict measures is narrow-minded and reactive, if not pessimistic. Stabilization and reconstruction of failing or failed states, for example, should be more
broadly viewed as important tasks within the
conceptualization of preemptive or preventive
measures designed to avoid war. Such use of stabilization and reconstruction capabilities requires
continual interagency coordination and collaboration.
5. Consensus formed: The various agencies and
multinational partners must recognize their mutual
need to work together in stability operations. That
realization creates a challenge to determine how
we might best work together and a question about
how to fund the right combination of agencies and
nations for the job.

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not
necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position of the Department
of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is
unlimited.

*****

More information on the Strategic Studies
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may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at http://www.carlisle.
army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.

4

